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The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective 
 
Robert Liñeira- University of Edinburgh and Centre on Constitutional Change 
Daniel Cetrà - University of Edinburgh and Centre on Constitutional Change 
 
Abstract 
 
Scotland is not the only sub-state unit in Europe where relevant political actors make 
claims for independence. To generate insights on these independence demands, we 
compare the drivers, arguments and popular support for secession in Scotland, the Basque 
Country, Catalonia and Flanders. We argue that national identity, party politics and the 
economy are behind the independence demands, and the exact articulation of these 
elements varies from case to case. Currently, the most salient of the independence 
demands are the ones from Catalonia; Basque demands for self-determination are less 
prominent than in the past, whereas the demand for voting on independence is much less 
articulated in Flanders. Although the Scottish independence referendum has set a 
precedent for solving independence disputes, we argue that the possibilities of exporting 
the Scottish referendum experience to these cases are limited.  
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Independence referendums in stable democracies are uncommon, and cases such as 
Quebec and Scotland are rare. However, there are a number of other places which witness 
relevant movements asking for independence from their state. The Scottish independence 
referendum has set a precedent for political actors who seek to channel their secession 
demands through an independence referendum. Pro-independence movements may use it 
to claim their right to hold a similar vote, and future attempts to get independence may 
be judged against the yardstick of Scotland.  
 
How can we compare these different cases for independence? In this article we contrast 
the drivers, arguments and support for secession in Scotland, the Basque Country, 
Catalonia and Flanders. The aim is to look for similarities and differences in the case for 
independence across different sub-state units, to generate insight on independence 
demands and how to channel them. Why these cases? All of them share a salient and 
widespread debate on the possibility of secession in democratic and relatively affluent 
societies. They also share the existence of self-governing institutions within a federal or 
regional scheme in the EU context. 
 
The article’s structure is as follows. First, we address the question of the relationship 
between national identity and support for independence. Second, we examine the strength 
of nationalist parties in the different sub-state party systems and their basic constitutional 
strategies. Third, we explore the role played by the economy and economic grievances in 
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the case for secession. We finally discuss the current proposals by the different nationalist 
movements and the possibilities of exporting the Scottish referendum model overseas. 
 
1. National identity and support for independence 
Conventional accounts tend to explain secessionism as a function of the identity-based 
distinctiveness of groups. Although demands for secession do not necessarily stem from 
cultural distinctiveness, national identity is usually considered the main driving factor of 
independence support. Evidence from Scotland, Catalonia, and the Basque Country 
shows that individuals who identify more strongly with the sub-state unit tend to be more 
in favour of independence.i However, there are non-secessionist nationalist movements 
and citizens with exclusive sub-state identity who support enhance self-government 
institutions for their territories, but not full secession. This implies that a link between 
identification and pro-independence attitudes is by no means definite. National identity 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the development of self-determination 
movements and the support to independence, although a distinctive identity is the 
strongest common factor across our cases. 
 
At the individual level, national identity is regarded as a cause of independence support 
because it is a very stable political attitude that does not change easily in the short term. 
National identity is a consequence of socialisation and past experiences, and it conditions 
citizens’ political attitudes in general and constitutional preferences in particular. It is the 
stable nature of national identity which makes it a good candidate to explain differences 
in support for independence across countries and individuals, but not changes in this 
support across time.ii 
 
Further, the fact that individuals tend to maintain the national identity, early acquired, 
through their lives, makes generational turnover the main mechanism of societies’ 
identity change, when new generations socialized under new identity patterns replace old 
generations. However, there is evidence that individuals change their national identities 
during their life course – even in short term periodsiii - which forces us to qualify this 
notion of individual’s national identity as something that affects the political process 
without being affected by it. 
 
Scotland, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Flanders have in common the existence of 
alternative national projects which affect –in different degrees- people’s identities. This 
implies that a state identity, mainly promoted by state institutions, competes with a sub-
state identity, promoted by various sub-state political and social actors. In fact, the 
existence of this sub-state alternative identity and national project is the main reason 
behind the setting up of self-governing institutions in all our 4 cases. Thus, all our sub-
state units have in common the existence of dual identities which are spread in different 
degrees and with different intensities. 
 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of these identities using a common indicator. All of them 
show that sub-state identities are more prevalent than state identities. Sub-state identity is 
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especially widespread in the Basque Country. A third identifies as only Basques; together 
with those who think of themselves as mainly Basques, they form a majority of 55%. In 
Scotland and Catalonia, exclusive sub-state identities are less prevalent than in the Basque 
case but the distributions lean towards Scottish and Catalan identities (53% and 46% 
respectively). 
 
With the exception of Flanders, state identities are selected by a small minority. In fact, 
Flanders shows a more balanced distribution than the other 3 cases, although there is a 
slight leaning towards state identities: 27% identify themselves as only or mainly Flemish 
and 31% as exclusive or mainly Belgians. The most frequent identity is without any doubt 
the intermediate one, with 42% identifying as equally Flemish and Belgians.  
 
Figure 1. National identity in 2014iv 
 
Note: with slight differences, the common question is: ‘Which best describes respondent, on a scale from 
'Sub-state not state’ to ‘State not sub-state'?’ 
 
The relationship between identity and support for independence is not a deterministic one: 
if support for independence was a mere function of national identity, we should expect 
the Basque Country to be the place with the highest support for independence, Flanders 
the one with the lowest, and Scotland and Catalonia somewhere in between. However, 
this is not exactly the case. 
 
Table 1 shows the support for different constitutional arrangements in our 4 cases. 
Constitutional preferences in public opinion polls are more volatile than national 
identities, and susceptible to wording effects. Still, with the exception of Flanders –where 
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only a minority supports more powers for the Flemish Parliament– there is clear support 
for enhanced self-government in the other 3 sub-state polities. Scotland and Catalonia 
show a similar distribution of preferences, being the two cases which show more 
widespread support for independence. The fact that the Basque Country is the place with 
more widespread sub-state identity but not more support for independence shows the 
necessity to add additional elements into the picture. The fact that constitutional 
preferences are more volatile than national identity also suggests that we need political 
and economic explanations to account for short-term changes.  
 
Table 1. Constitutional preferences in 2014iv 
 Scotland Catalonia Basque Country Flanders 
No devolved Parliament 6 4 6 4 
Less powers n.a. n.a. n.a. 20 
Status quo 23 27 38 38 
More powers 30 22 33 35 
Independence 41 46 23 4 
No Parliament - Status quo 29 31 44 62 
More powers - Independence 71 68 56 39 
(n) (1,339) (1,200) (600) (1,841) 
Note: The question wording and the alternatives offered to respondents vary significantly across the four 
cases. 
 
2. Support and strategies of the nationalist parties 
Identity is not the full story to account for independence support. Politics is important 
and, in particular, party politics. Decades of research on public opinion have persistently 
shown that parties provide citizens with cues which help them to establish their 
preferences. Parties, unlike issues or candidates, give continuity and structure to the 
political debate, and act as ‘perceptual screens’ through which individuals follow the 
political process. Consequently, party stances on constitutional options reflect but may 
also affect followers’ constitutional preferences. 
 
Our cases share some similarities. The party systems of Scotland, Catalonia, and the 
Basque Country are a mix of state-wide and non-state-wide parties, which means that 
nationalist parties compete for votes with parties that also stand for seats all over the state 
territory. In contrast, party systems in Belgium are divided along linguistic or community 
lines, which indicates that Flemish parties stand for different constituencies than French-
speaking parties. Since parties do not risk being sanctioned by voters from the other 
community, the dynamics of party competition are exclusively regional, pulling apart 
Flemish and Walloon parties and electorates. 
 
An element that all 4 party systems share is the existence of a clear pro-independence 
party: the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC), Sortu, 
and the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang). There are also smaller parties which support 
independence. The Popular Unity Candidacies (CUP) in Catalonia and the Greens in 
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Scotland have parliamentary representation and support independence. However, 
independence is not their main issue or they are not big enough to dispute and claim the 
issue ownership of the independence cause. Indeed, the SNP is unique in the sense that it 
does not have to face significant competition from another nationalist party. The other 3 
cases show a more significant division between nationalist parties seeking independence 
and parties seeking more self-government within their current state. Sub-state nationalism 
is a dimension of electoral competition in the other three. 
 
In the case of the Basque Country, the Christian-democratic Basque Nationalist Party 
(EAJ-PNV) has always been the main nationalist party. It has been the incumbent party 
in Basque self-government institutions for most of the time since the first regional 
elections in 1980. It has been elusive about the independence question, alternating 
between pro-self-government and pro-sovereignty positions. During this period, it has 
always competed with the Basque radical nationalist left, which constitutes the main 
advocate of independence. The party labels of this movement have frequently changed, 
and they have also experienced outlaw periods because of the ties with the violent 
organisation ETA. Their current party label is Sortu, which stood in the last Basque 
election for the Basque Country Unite coalition (EHB, a coalition of Alternatiba, Aralar, 
Eusko Alkartasuna and Sortu). Currently, the EAJ-PNV heads a minority government 
whereas EHB holds 21 of 75 seats. The former will seek the support of the latter in order 
to deliver its proposal of a new political status for the Basque Country in 2020.  
 
The main nationalist party in Catalonia since the advent of democracy has been the 
coalition Convergence & Union (CiU), which has enjoyed the presidency of Catalan 
institutions for 23 years since the first regional elections in 1980. It has been historically 
associated with the promotion of self-government within Spain, but recently stood for the 
holding of a referendum which includes the independence option, being ambivalent about 
its positioning on the question. CiU is a coalition between two parties: Democratic 
Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) and Democratic Union of Catalonia (UDC). The 
former currently tends to be in favour of independence, whereas the latter supports a 
confederation scheme. However, it is unclear how unanimous these stances are within the 
parties. CiU currently holds a minority government with the parliamentary support of the 
pro-independence ERC, which holds 21 seats out of 135.  
 
In Flanders, the main nationalist party is the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), which has 
experienced a spectacular rise in the past few years. Founded in 2001, the N-VA supports 
confederalism in the short term and independence in the long term. It is currently the 
leading party of the Flemish coalition government and member of the Belgian federal 
coalition government. The pro-independence and far-right Vlaams Belang (previously 
named Vlaams Blok) was the main nationalist party in Flanders in the past, but it is now 
severely damaged by the success of the N-VA. There is a tacit cordon sanitaire around 
the Vlaams Belang, which means that the party is blocked from accessing political power 
by the rest of the parties due to its extremist ideology. Thus, in practice the N-VA is the 
only Flemish nationalist party with actual capacity of political influence. 
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Whereas national identity has a strong exogenous influence on individual’s attitudes 
towards independence, party stances on constitutional options may also influence 
individual’s constitutional preferences. However, identity and party politics are not the 
whole story. Economics may also colour the case for independence and influence the 
popular support for it.  
 
3. The economic case for independence 
The economy, and economic grievances in particular, are used as explanations of the 
existence of support to secession. The dominant prediction in the literature is that the 
regions or groups that are better off than the rest of the country will have a higher 
likelihood of demanding secession since they often subsidise poorer regions.v The 
mechanism is quite straightforward: by separating, they would have more disposable 
resources because they would no longer be subject to fiscal imbalances with respect to 
the rest of the state. They could also provide more public goods and do so more 
efficiently, as a consequence of an increased homogeneity of preferences in a smaller 
region.vi 
 
The role that the economy plays in the case for secession shows similarities and 
differences across our cases. Whereas the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Flanders are 
relatively wealthier with regards to the rest of Spain and Belgium, this is not the case of 
Scotland. Table 2 gathers the GDP per capita in our four cases, and puts it in relation to 
the GDP of the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium. The third column shows that the 
GDP of Scotland is 7% less than the overall UK GDP, the Catalonia and the Basque 
Country are 17 and 34% over the Spain GDP per inhabitant. Flanders is roughly the same 
than the overall position of Belgium, which is composed of three regions. Brussels is by 
far the richest region in Belgium (62,000 GDP per capita), whereas Wallonia is the 
poorest (24,600). Flanders’ GDP per inhabitant is 37% higher than Wallonia’s. 
 
In Scotland, even if there have been some attempts to build an economic case for 
independence around oil and tax revenues, the argument that, by separating, there would 
be more disposable resources, is difficult to convey. Additionally, the economic argument 
to support secession is not employed in all cases. It is used in Catalonia and Flanders, but 
less often in the Basque Country. 
 
Table 2. Socioeconomic characteristicsvii 
 Population 
(Millions) 
Nominal GDP 
2011 in Euros 
Ratio sub-state / state  
GDP per capita 2011 
Scotland 5.2 26,200 0.93 
Catalonia 7.3 26,600 1.17 
Basque Country 2.1 30,500 1.34 
Flanders 6.3 30,100 1.00 
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Until recently, Catalan nationalism mainly focused on linguistic and cultural issues; the 
recognition of national distinctiveness, and the promotion of the Catalan language, were 
the main goals of the nationalist movement. Economic issues have gained salience in 
recent years. The perception of economic grievance and, specifically, the idea that the 
difference between Catalonia’s contribution and what it receives in transfers and 
investments from the Spanish government is too large, has fuelled a sense of grievance 
across Catalan elites and a significant portion of the Catalan public. This dispute has also 
fired-up discussions between the Catalan and the Spanish governments about the amount 
of the Catalan fiscal deficit. Thus, the parties favouring secession or greater devolution in 
Catalonia have agreed on the perception that the fiscal treatment received by the Catalan 
government is unfair, and that it limits Catalonia’s ability to develop stronger social 
policies and promote economic growth. Under these circumstances, secession has often 
been presented as an alternative that would increase the available budget of the Catalan 
government and remove obstacles to desired policies. 
 
In the Basque case, the economic argument for independence is largely absent. The main 
reason is that it enjoys a beneficial fiscal agreement. Under the concierto económico, the 
three Basque historic territories that currently form the Basque autonomous community 
set and collect most taxes and pass on a share to the Spanish government for common 
services. This advantageous fiscal arrangement can be seen as a structural difficulty for 
Basque independence, given that a case of economic grievance similar to the one in 
Catalonia cannot be made. 
 
As in the Catalan case, the cultural and language domain was very salient in Flanders. 
Although a degree of controversy still remains in the Flemish periphery of Brussels, the 
cultural case is now less prominent in favour of the economic one. The economic 
argument is built around two related ideas. First, a sense of grievance over transfers to 
Wallonia and a critical attitude to the generous Walloon welfare policies. Second, the 
notion of a democratic deficit, which refers to the idea that Flanders’ pro-liberal policy 
preferences (compared to the more ‘pro-socialist’ Wallonia) cannot be delivered due to 
the consociational scheme of federal institutions. More powers for the Flemish region are 
deemed necessary to make congruent policy preferences with policy outcomes in 
Flanders.  
 
The different policy preferences argument is also present in Scotland but, in this case, the 
argument comes from the other side of the political spectrum: independence would be 
used to promote a more social-democratic policy agenda than the one preferred by the 
UK government. The SNP makes a case for Scottish independence that largely focuses 
on welfare and social policy, connecting independence to social fairness and drawing on 
myths of egalitarianism and the notion of democratic deficit (see articles by Malcolm 
Harvey, Kirstein Rummery and Craig McAngus, and Sheila Riddell et al., in this volume).  
 
Discussion: independence referendums beyond Scotland 
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Independence referendums will continue to be rare events. However, the Scottish 
experience has helped to normalise them, becoming a potential yardstick for solving 
future secession disputes (see Stephen Tierney in this volume). This is so because of the 
fairness of the Scottish referendum process, the general spirit of mutual respect and co-
operation achieved between the two sides, the level of engagement with the debate by the 
public, and the acceptance of the results by all parties. 
 
There are 4 characteristics that future independence processes may be asked to mirror, 
from the Scottish model, to be considered legitimate. First, the right to claim an 
independence referendum must derive from a popular mandate. Second, an independence 
decision must be decided directly by citizens via referendum. Third, the terms of the 
referendum should be agreed between the state and the sub-state governments; the way 
to address independence disputes should be settled by a bilateral agreement within 
domestic law. Fourth, the referendum has to pose a clear question to citizens.  
 
In Scotland, the initiation of the referendum was agreed by the UK government after the 
SNP won a majority at the 2011 Scottish Parliament election, advocating for an 
independence referendum in its party manifesto. In addition, the referendum as 
instrument had already been used in 1979 (there was a small Yes majority, but it did not 
reach the required threshold of 40% of the electorate), setting a precedent for the 1997 
referendum that approved the establishment of a Scottish Parliament, and the 2014 
referendum that went a step further to ask about independence. Finally, the terms of the 
referendums were set at the Edinburgh Agreement between the UK and the Scottish 
governments, which included the clear question condition and its approval by the 
Electoral Commission. 
 
In Catalonia and the Basque Country there have been attempts to hold referendums on 
self-determination by their sub-state governments. Both sub-state units have in common 
with Scotland the use of the referendum instrument to decide on self-government issues. 
In contrast with Flanders, where the constitutional reforms that led to the setting of the 
Flemish Parliament were passed by a parliamentary vote and not by a popular one, 
Catalonia and the Basque Country set and reformed their respective self-government 
institutions by mandatory referendums. However, to hold a referendum that includes the 
possibility of independence is problematic because the Spanish constitution does not 
contemplate the possibility of secession nor any other sovereign nation than the Spanish 
people as a whole. 
 
The most serious of the attempts to hold a referendum on independence outside Scotland 
has been the recent voting in Catalonia. On November 9 there was a non-binding vote on 
independence, promoted by the Catalan government and opposed by the Spanish 
government. The vote, which came to be known as 'participation process', was more an 
act of protest by the pro-independence side than a decisive test on the issue of secession. 
Voters were asked two questions: whether Catalonia should be a state and, if they replied 
yes, whether it should be an independent state. The Catalan government estimation is that 
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around 36% of Catalan residents turned out to vote. Results showed that 80.7% voted yes 
to both questions, 10% voted yes to the first question and no to the second, while 4.5% 
voted no. The next step in this process could be what has been called by the Catalan 
government a ‘plebiscite election’, where pro-independence parties would stand for the 
next parliamentary election with a joint candidacy, with independence as the single point 
in the candidacy manifesto. This strategy is currently under discussion by the interested 
parties.   
 
The vote in Catalonia was the result of an intense mobilisation period by self-
determination supporters. The main trigger was the political dissatisfaction generated by 
a failed constitutional reform of the Catalan statute of autonomy. After being passed by 
the Spanish and Catalan Parliament, and ratified by the Catalan people in a mandatory 
referendum in 2006, the statute was taken to the Constitutional Court by the Popular 
Party (PP), the main opposition party to the Spanish Socialist government at the time. 
The Constitutional Court ruling in 2010 amended the statute, decreasing further the 
powers granted by the approved version: 14 articles were declared unconstitutional, 
several were subjected to reinterpretation, and the statement in the preamble that 
Catalonia is a nation was explicitly described as without legal standing. 
 
This outcome was perceived, by large sections of the Catalan population, to be an 
illegitimate resolution because: only 10 of the 12 Constitutional Court magistrates voted 
on the ruling because one member had died without a successor been appointed; the 
authority of another member was challenged; and, the term of three other members had 
already expired when the decision was made. 
 
Still, any reform to enhance self-government and the recognition of Catalonia’s national 
distinctiveness looked less likely, damaging the political opportunities of those groups in 
favour of a federal reform of the constitutional framework, but giving momentum to 
promoters of overcoming the constitutional framework. The perception that the usual 
constitutional reform process could not be used for this purpose was accentuated by the 
PP’s ample victory at the 2011 general election. The polarisation of party stances has 
helped make the independence issue ever more salient. Also, public opinion has shifted, 
from an overwhelmingly pro-autonomy position to an increasingly pro-independence 
stance. From 2006–14, the proportion that chose an independent Catalan state in a multi-
option question has risen from 14% in 2006 to around 45% in 2014.  
 
The Basque government also tried to agree a constitutional referendum with the Spanish 
government under the so-called Ibarretxe Plan, which was promoted by the PNV Basque 
president of the time and rejected by the Spanish Parliament in 2005. The party’s demands 
for a constitutional referendum are now less salient. Drawing inspiration from the Scottish 
referendum and the Catalan mobilisation, a recently created civil society organisation 
called ‘It's in our hands’ (Gure Esku Dago) organises events that aim to push for a 
referendum. However, the present stance of the PNV is a new political status for the 
Basque Country, which is an ambiguous notion that basically pretends to protect the 
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powers of Basque institutions and to establish a bilateral political relationship with the 
Spanish government. The emphasis on bilateralism is an old demand by Basque 
nationalism, and it was evident in the ‘co-sovereignty’ proposal of the Ibarretxe Plan.viii 
 
In contrast to the other cases, public support for independence in Flanders is minimal, and 
political efforts to promote a secession referendum have been largely absent. In fact, the 
current territorial proposal by the main nationalist party (N-VA) is further 
decentralisation (confederalism). Belgium would have two autonomous entities – 
Flanders and Wallonia – and a bilingual capital, Brussels. The idea of confederalism 
partly derives from the ‘problem’ of Brussels, today a basically French-speaking city in 
historical Flemish territory that Flemish parties do not want to abandon. Flemish 
nationalists were reluctant to accept the creation of the Brussels Capital Region (1989) in 
the first place, for fear that it would align with the mostly French-speaking Walloon 
region. Under this plan, the Belgian parliament and government would disappear and be 
replaced by a co-ordinating state authority that would not be directly elected. It would 
retain control over the army and diplomacy, but key issues such as social security, tax and 
labour policy would be transferred to Flanders and Wallonia. Thus, rather than a 
referendum on independence, a progressive hollowing of the Belgian state to the benefit 
of the regions seems the most likely future scenario.  
 
In sum, identity, politics, and the economy are behind the independence claims in Europe, 
although the precise articulation of these elements is case-specific. The most salient of 
these claims are now the ones from Catalonia; Basque demands for self-determination are 
less prominent than in the past, whereas the demand for voting on independence is much 
less articulated in Flanders. In any case, it is far from certain that there would be a new 
independence referendum in any of these places. No relevant actor in Flanders is pushing 
for it, whereas to hold such a referendum in Spain would require a change in the 
conception of the constitution and an agreement between governments that now looks 
unlikely.    
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